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On the view that we cannot perceive movement and change: Lessons from Locke 
and Reid 
 
Christoph Hoerl 
 
Abstract: According to the snapshot view of temporal experience, instances of 
movement and change cannot, strictly speaking, be objects of sensory perception. 
Perceptual consciousness instead consists of a succession of individual momentary 
experiences, none of which is itself an experience of movement or change. The 
snapshot view is often presented as an intuitively appealing view of the nature of 
temporal experience, even by philosophers who ultimately reject it. Yet, it is puzzling 
how this can be so, given that its central claim – that we can never just perceive things 
moving or changing – clearly flies in the face of our common sense view of the 
phenomenology of experience. In this paper, I offer a diagnosis of how it is possible 
that the deep conflict between the snapshot view and our phenomenological intuitions 
can sometimes go unnoticed. The materials for this diagnosis can, I think, be found in 
some passages in Thomas Reid’s Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, in which 
he criticises John Locke’s account of the origins of the idea of succession, as 
presented in chapter 14 of book II of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. 
As I argue, a crucial aspect of Reid’s criticisms can be seen to turn on the idea that 
Locke fails to distinguish between two quite different variants of the snapshot view, 
which I call the memory theory and the mirroring theory of temporal experience, 
respectively. It is the failure to distinguish between these two different variants of the 
snapshot view, I suggest, that can also make the snapshot view appear more 
compatible with our phenomenological intuitions than it in fact is.   
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On the view that we cannot perceive movement and change: Lessons from Locke 
and Reid 
 
The recent resurgence of interest in temporal aspects of consciousness has also led to 
a revival, in some quarters, of what is sometimes referred to as the snapshot view of 
temporal experience.1 As the name indicates, the snapshot view takes our perceptual 
system to operate in a way that is akin to the way a cinematic camera works:2 Just as a 
movie consists of a rapid succession of ‘still’ or ‘static’ images – individual 
‘snapshots’ – perceptual consciousness, on the snapshot view, consists of a succession 
of individual experiences, none of which is itself an experience of succession. All we 
have when we are looking at a moving object, for instance, is a succession of discrete 
momentary perceptual experiences, each of which is an experience of the object at 
one location on its trajectory.3 According to the snapshot view, in other words, we 
cannot, strictly speaking, perceive instances of movement and change. Rather, our 
ability to become aware of movement and change has to be explained in some other 
way. 
 Historically, one of the most explicit proponents of a snapshot view of 
temporal experience is Thomas Reid. Reid develops his defence of the snapshot view 
                                                
1 Recent proponents of versions of such a view include Francis Crick and Christoph Koch (2003), 
Robin Le Poidevin (2007) and Philippe Chuard (2011). 
2 For this reason, Dainton (2010) also refers to it as the ‘cinematic view’ of temporal experience. 
Chuard (2011) also uses the term ‘temporal perceptual atomism’. Dainton (2010) discusses the main 
two theoretical rivals of the snapshot view under the titles ‘the retentional model’ and ‘the extensional 
model’. I will set these aside for the purposes of this paper. 
3 For the moment, I am bracketing cases of motion blur, which make a slightly more nuanced 
characterization of the snapshot theorist’s position necessary. I will return to this issue shortly.  
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in the fifth chapter of essay III of his Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, in the 
context of a criticism of some passages in chapter 14 of book II of John Locke’s An 
Essay Concerning Human Understanding.4 Aspects of Reid’s critique of Locke are 
already quite familiar from the literature on temporal experience (see, e.g., section 2.3 
of Dainton, 2010). In this paper, I want to argue that taking a fresh look at the debate 
between them can also help resolve what might otherwise appear to be a 
metaphilosophical puzzle. Proponents of the snapshot view sometimes write as 
though it was fairly easy to reconcile with our common sense intuitions about the 
phenomenology of temporal experience, or might even have phenomenology 
speaking in its favour.5 Moreover, even philosophers opposed to the snapshot view 
sometimes present it as an intuitively appealing position, although they think it is 
ultimately to be rejected (see, e.g., Kelly, 2005, p. 141; Lee, 2014). Yet, the central 
theoretical commitment of the snapshot view – that we cannot literally perceive 
instances of movement and change – arguably just flies in the face of common sense. 
Little could seem to be more obvious than that we can often just see an object move, 
                                                
4 The chapter in Reid’s Essay in which he discusses Locke’s account of temporal experience 
immediately precedes the one containing his well-known critique of Locke’s account of personal 
identity. 
5 See, e.g., Chuard (2011, p. 11), who maintains that “the disagreement [between the snapshot view and 
rival views of temporal experience] is really over what best explains the phenomenological 
appearances, not over the appearances themselves.” Reid himself is actually an important exception 
here. Otherwise famously the champion of common sense, he is explicit that the snapshot view he 
advocates constitutes an error theory regarding our everyday assumptions about the phenomenology of 
temporal experience.  
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for instance.6 How then, is it possible for anyone to think that the snapshot view has 
intuitive appeal (even setting aside whether or not this is then also taken to be a good 
reason for endorsing it)? 
 So my question in what follows is not so much the question as to whether the 
snapshot theory is a plausible explanatory theory of temporal experience – though in 
fact I take it that it isn’t, and what I say below lays out some of the arguments against 
the snapshot theory. The more specific question I will be mainly interested in is how, 
despite these arguments against it, the snapshot view can nevertheless initially appear 
to provide an intuitive picture of the nature of temporal experience. More to the point, 
as I already indicated, the main argument against the snapshot theory is a 
phenomenological one (rather than, say, one based on research in cognitive science). 
So, if this argument is any good, one would normally expect the falsity of the theory 
to be particularly obvious. The opponent to the snapshot theory therefore needs an 
explanation why this is not so. It is in the context of this issue, I believe, that taking 
another look at the debate between Reid and Locke can prove useful, because it 
provides the materials for a diagnosis of why the conflict between the snapshot view 
and our phenomenological intuitions may not always be evident. This is because it 
shows that the snapshot view can come in two quite distinct variants, oscillating 
between which will obscure this conflict.  
My discussion is divided up into two main sections. In section 1, I provide an 
exposition of elements of Locke’s account of temporal experience in chapter 14 of 
                                                
6 As John Foster (1982, p. 255) puts it, “duration and change through time seem to be presented to us 
with the same phenomenological immediacy as homogeneity and variation of colour through space”. 
As with other aspects of perception, there are of course certain limits to our capacity to see, e.g., 
movement. This is something that will become important in what follows.  
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book II of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, and discuss Reid’s charge 
that there is a crucial ambiguity at the heart of Locke’s account. As I argue, Reid’s 
criticism of Locke can be seen to turn on the idea that we need to distinguish between 
what I will call the memory theory and the mirroring theory, as two in fact quite 
distinct variants of the snapshot view of temporal experience, together with the idea 
that only the former makes for a viable explanatory theory. In section 2, I then argue 
that distinguishing between the memory theory and the mirroring theory is not just 
helpful in the context of providing an analysis of Reid’s argument against Locke, but 
also in explaining how it is that the snapshot view of temporal experience can come to 
appear to be less in tension with our phenomenological intuitions than it actually is. 
Locke’s writings can serve as a useful case study here too. 
 
1. Locke, Reid, and two variants of the snapshot view 
In chapter 14 of book II of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Locke 
considers a number of features of movement perception in order to arrive at an 
account of how it is possible for us to become aware of motion and succession.7 His 
claim, in particular, is that certain limitations in our ability to perceive movement 
demonstrate that the idea of succession does not arise from sensation, but from 
reflection on what he calls the ‘train of ideas’ in our own minds.8 As Locke puts it: 
                                                
7 The broader context here is, of course, Locke’s concept empiricism. As he would put it, Locke’s 
question concerns the origins of our ideas of movement and succession. As we will see, though, his 
main focus in pursuing this idea is on detailing a number of different experiential situations, only some 
of which, according to Locke, give rise to these ideas. I therefore believe that it is also legitimate to 
construe his project in the way I am doing it here.  
8 Jacovides (2016, p. 187) calls this the ‘narrow Lockean view’, and it is arguably Locke’s endorsement 
of this view in chapter 14 of book II of the Essay that allows Reid to interpret the remarks Locke makes 
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Thus, by reflecting on the appearance of various ideas one after another in our 
understanding, we get the notion of succession; which if anyone should think 
we did rather get from our observation of motion by our senses, he will 
perhaps be of my mind, when he considers that even motion produces in his 
mind an idea of succession no otherwise than as it produces there a continued 
train of distinguishable ideas. For a man, looking upon a body really moving, 
perceives yet no motion at all, unless that motion produces a constant train of 
successive ideas. (Locke, 1690, 2.14.6)9 
 
One of the perceptual phenomena Locke thinks illustrates this last point is that of 
motion blur – e.g., the case of looking at an object which is rotating so fast that we 
cannot see the movement; instead, we only see a circular blur (ibid., 2.14.8). As 
Locke interprets this case, we do not perceive the motion of the object because each 
individual idea produced by the moving object is already an idea of the object in all of 
the different positions through which it rotates, and successive such ideas do not 
differ from one another. Thus, what the phenomenon of motion blur shows, for 
                                                                                                                                      
in this chapter in terms of the idea of a snapshot view of experience. As Jacovides also notes (ibid.), in 
chapter 7 of the same book of the Essay, Locke provides what appears to be a conflicting ‘broad view’, 
according to which the idea of succession “though suggested by our senses, […] is more constantly 
offered to us by what passes in our minds” (Locke, 1690, 2.7.9). My focus in this paper will be 
exclusively on what might be identified as one particular strand of argument in favour of the narrow 
view in chapter 14 of book II.  
9 See also ibid. 2.14.16: “Whether these several ideas in a man’s mind be made by certain motions, I 
will not here dispute; but this I am sure, that they include no idea of motion in their appearance; and if 
a man had not the idea of motion otherwise, I think he would have none at all.” 
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Locke, is that, whilst each of the successive ideas produced in me when I observe an 
object in motion may be an idea as of the object at a number of different points on its 
trajectory, they are not thereby individually ideas of movement.10 Locke infers from 
this that becoming aware of the movement of an object instead requires having a 
succession of qualitatively different such ideas, and being reflectively aware of that 
succession.11 
 It is this appeal to the notion of ‘reflection’, and the role it plays in Locke’s 
account of how we can become aware of instances of movement and change, that is 
the primary focus of Reid’s criticism of Locke in the fifth chapter of essay III of his 
Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man. Locke, Reid thinks, fails to distinguish 
clearly between two quite different ways in which the notion of reflection might be 
                                                
10 Yaffe (2011, p. 394) describes Locke’s thought here by saying that, long before the invention of 
photography, Locke hit upon the idea of perceptual experience possessing something akin to a shutter 
speed. In order for a photographic image to be created, the shutter of the camera needs to be open for a 
brief period of time, and this can result in a fast moving object figuring in the image at what are in fact 
several successive positions in its movement, thus creating a blurry image of the object. Locke can be 
seen to explain the phenomenon of perceptual motion blur by appealing to the thought that sensory 
perception similarly depends on mechanisms that sample what goes on over a brief interval of time. 
What are in fact successive events can therefore figure in it, but in such a way that that we can not 
discriminate them from one another temporally. (The point is taken up by Hume, 1739-40, 1.2.3.) 
Indeed, Locke thinks that individual ideas themselves take up time (Locke, 1690, 2.14.10), even though 
they are not themselves things of which we can discern successive temporal parts (ibid. 2.15.9). On this 
issue, see also Falkenstein (2013, p. 106). This aspect of Locke’s view contrasts with Reid’s claim that 
“the operation of [the senses] are confined to the present point in time, and there can be no succession 
in a point of time” (Reid 1785, p. 270). See also footnote 16, below.  
11 Locke (1690, 2.1.2) famously claims that all our ideas must stem from either sensation or reflection, 
or from a combination of both. What he thus takes the phenomenon of motion blur to show is that the 
idea of succession cannot stem from sensation alone, but requires reflection. 
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understood, and due to “this ambiguity his account […] is darkened and perplexed” 
(Reid, 1785, p. 269). On one reading of Locke’s view, in line with his own 
characterization of reflection as “the perception of the operations of our own minds 
within us” (Locke, 1690, 2.1.4; emphasis in original), the term might simply be taken 
to refer to a form of introspection structurally similar to external perception. On this 
reading, though, accounting for our awareness of the succession of our own 
experiences should present as much of an explanatory problem as does accounting for 
our awareness of a succession of perceived external events, in Locke’s view. Indeed, 
the two problems would be structurally exactly parallel to each other. So we have 
made no progress in explaining how an awareness of succession is possible.  As 
Gideon Yaffe puts a similar point: 
 
Locke cannot simply point to the fact that the object of reflection – namely the 
succession of our ideas – is successive to explain reflection’s ability to provide 
us with the idea of succession. After all, motions, too, are successive, Locke 
thinks, but sensation is not, on those grounds, able to provide us with the idea 
of succession. (Yaffe, 2011, p. 400; see also p. 398) 
 
So instead, Reid suggests that Locke must really be using the term ‘reflection’ in a 
different sense, when he says that it is the source of our awareness of succession. 
What he must really mean is in fact our capacity to remember our own past 
experiences. In other words, any awareness we have of how things unfold over time is 
instead based on the capacity to compare present perceptual experiences with 
remembered ones. As he puts it: 
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[S]peaking philosophically, it is only by the aid of memory that we discern 
motion, or any succession whatsoever. We see the present place of the body; 
we remember the successive advance it made to that place. The first can then 
only give us a conception of motion, when joined to the last. (Reid 1785, p. 
271) 
 
In effect, Reid thus proceeds as follows. He first ascribes to Locke a commitment to 
the snapshot view of temporal experience12 – based on the latter’s claim that the idea 
of succession does not arise from sensation, but from reflection on the ‘train of ideas’ 
                                                
12 Whilst Locke could not, of course, use the camera as a metaphor, his account is not entirely free from 
appeals to technological metaphors. At one point he considers “whether it be not probable that our 
ideas do, whilst we are awake, succeed one another in our minds at certain distances; not much unlike 
the images in the inside of a lantern, turned round by the heat of a candle” (Locke, 1690, 2.14.9). The 
phrase is quoted by Laurence Sterne in Tristram Shandy, suggesting that lanterns of the relevant type 
were a fairly common sight at the time. In a 1929 article in Mind, Samuel Alexander speaks of coming 
across a Christmas tree decoration in the form of a hexagonal lantern, which was set into rotation by a 
candle at its base, and suggests that a lantern of this type must have been what Locke had in mind, 
adding that “[i]n philosophical and scientific places such as Manchester, Locke’s lantern […] may be 
obtained […] at toyshops for sixpence” (Alexander, 1929, p. 271). Perhaps an even better match for 
Locke’s description are so-called ‘trotting horse’ or ‘pacing horse’ lamps, coming originally from 
China. These are also typically hexagonal, but it is not the lamp itself that is set in rotation by the rising 
air from the candle, but a set of cut-out silhouettes mounted inside the candle, whose shadows are then 
successively projected onto the translucent sides of the lantern. As the sides are not fully transparent, 
the rotating silhouettes themselves can’t be seen, only their shadows, and as the set of silhouettes 
rotates in circular motion, but the six sides of the lamp are flat, each silhouette is only close and 
parallel to each side for a moment, when it casts the darkest and most well-defined shadow, after which 
the shadow becomes blurry again. On each of the sides, the effect is thus that of one shadow appearing 
and disappearing, and then another shadow appearing an disappearing, and so on. 
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in our own minds. And he then draws a contrast between two different versions of the 
snapshot view – corresponding to the two different ways of understanding the notion 
of ‘reflection’ that he distinguishes – only one of which, he claims, makes for a viable 
explanatory theory. On one way of understanding the snapshot view, connected with 
the first reading of Locke’s notion of ‘reflection’ that Reid considers, it amounts to 
what is we might call a mirroring theory of temporal experience.13 On it, the fact that 
the train of ideas is itself successive, and changes in a way that mirrors the changes in 
the objects of perception, is meant to account for our awareness of succession. To put 
it another way, according to such a mirroring theory, our awareness of changes in the 
world around us is explained in terms of the idea that, as these changes happen, a 
changing sequence of ideas is produced in us, and this is what we become aware of 
through reflection.  
 As we have seen, the point Reid makes against such an account of temporal 
experience is that it is explanatorily vacuous. It faces the obvious problem (amongst 
others) that it seems to presuppose what it is trying to explain. In assuming that the 
idea that temporal features of the stream of experiences mirror temporal features of 
the world can be made to do explanatory work in accounting for my awareness of the 
                                                
13 Lee (2014) uses the term ‘mirroring view’ to describe a somewhat similar idea. However, he takes 
this view to be an ingredient in certain extensionalist views of temporal experience. Extensionalism is 
typically understood to be a doctrine that tries to explain how there can be genuine perceptual 
awareness of instances of movement and change. By contrast, on the mirroring theory as conceived of 
here, the fact succession and change in the objects of perception is mirrored by succession and change 
in the stream of experiences is meant to explain how we can become aware of the former despite not 
being able to do so directly in perception. This is why the theory is to be thought of as an instance of 
the snapshot view of temporal experience.  
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latter, it seems to take my ability to become aware of the former for granted.14 And it 
is not at all clear that it is any easier to account for my introspective awareness of 
temporal features of my own stream of experiences than it is to account for my 
awareness of temporal features of the world presented in experience. In fact, we have 
made no progress in explaining how an awareness of succession is possible. 
Having thus rejected the mirroring theory, Reid advances a second, rival, 
understanding of the snapshot theory, corresponding to the second way of reading the 
notion of ‘reflection’ he distinguishes. On this understanding of the snapshot theory, it 
amounts to what is typically referred to as a memory theory of temporal experience. 
According to it, it is only because my present ideas are accompanied by memories of 
different ideas that I had earlier that I can become aware of movement and change.15 
As Reid says:  
 
                                                
14 Compare here also Ruth Millikan’s critical discussion of what she calls the ‘passive picture theory’ 
of perception, and her charge that it produces “a façade of understanding that overlooks the need to 
give any account at all of the way the inner understander works, any account of the mechanics of inner 
representation” (Millikan, 2000, p. 112). What I am calling the mirroring theory of temporal experience 
is amongst the targets of Millikan’s criticism. 
15 Other proponents of a memory theory of temporal experience include Strong (1896, p. 155), who 
writes: “The lapse of time is […] not directly experienced, but constructed after the event. […] We 
never lift ourselves up out of the stream of time and view it as a stream except representatively, except 
through memory. To wish to apprehend succession, or change, or the lapse of time directly, and not 
through memory, is as foolish as to wish to apprehend the past directly, and not through memory”. 
What makes the memory theory, as I understand it, a version of the snapshot view, is precisely this 
denial of the idea that we can directly apprehend succession or change in perception. This also 
constitutes the difference from the retentional view of temporal experience, which builds a past-
directed element into the nature of perceptual experience itself. 
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Reflection upon the train of ideas can be nothing but remembering it, and 
giving attention to what our memory testifies concerning it: for if we did not 
remember it, we could not have a thought about it. So that it is evident that 
this reflection includes remembrance, without which there could be no 
reflection on what is past, and consequently no idea of succession. (Reid 1785, 
p. 270)16 
 
Reid is very clear – much more so than other proponents of a snapshot view – that his 
theory ultimately involves a rejection of our common sense view of the 
phenomenology of temporal experience. And I think getting right the sense in which 
snapshot theorists are, in general, committed to such a rejection of common sense 
turns crucially on bearing in mind the distinction, effectively highlighted by Reid, 
                                                
16 The argument against Locke outlined on the preceding pages is probably best seen as just one of 
several routes by which Reid arrives at his memory theory. For instance, he also mentions the separate 
idea (perhaps motivated by an implicit commitment to presentism; though see Van Cleve, 2015, pp. 
250f.) that “the operations of both [the senses and consciousness] are confined to the present point of 
time, and [that] there can be no succession in a point of time” (Reid 1785, p. 270). This idea plays an 
important role in his account of how the vulgar can be in error about this aspect of experience (as Reid 
supposes), common sense sometimes referring to an interval as present (‘the present hour’), rather than 
operating with the strict philosophical notion of the present as an indivisible point. However, it should 
also be noted that this way of motivating the memory theory is in tension with claims Reid makes only 
moments later in the context of his discussion of Locke’s account of the origins of the idea of duration. 
There he writes: “[S]uppose a succession of as many ideas as you please, if none of these ideas have 
duration, nor any interval of duration be between one and another […] there can be no interval of 
duration between the first and the last, how great soever their number might be. […] Nothing indeed is 
more certain that every elementary part of duration must have duration, as every elementary part of 
extension must have extension” (ibid., 272).  
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between the mirroring theory and the memory theory, as two quite distinct variants of 
the snapshot view. As I want to show in what follows, this can again be brought out 
by considering aspects of Locke’s account of temporal experience. 
 
2. Locke on motion too slow to be perceived 
It is not just the case of motion blur – of motion too fast to be perceived – that Locke 
appeals to in support of his view that our awareness of motion and change turns on 
our ability to reflect on our train of ideas. In support of this claim, he also cites the 
opposite case, namely that of motion too slow to be perceived. He writes: 
 
[T]he reason, why motions very slow, though they are constant, are not 
perceived by us; because in their remove from one sensible part towards 
another, their change of distance is so slow, that it causes no new ideas in us, 
but a good while one after another: And so not causing a constant train of new 
ideas, to follow one another immediately in our minds, we have no perception 
of motion; which consisting in a constant succession, we cannot perceive that 
succession, without a constant succession of varying ideas arising from it. 
(Locke, 1690, 2.14.7) 
 
Locke gives as examples of things that are in fact constantly moving, but move too 
slowly for us to perceive their movement “the hands of clocks, [the] shadows of sun-
dials” and the sun itself.17 What he suggests in the passage quoted is that the reasons 
                                                
17 As far as I could find out, clocks featuring a second hand only started to appear towards the end of 
the 17th century, and this phrase suggests that Locke may not have been familiar with them at the time 
of writing An Essay Concerning Human Understanding.   
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why we do not see objects like these move, even though they do move, has to do with 
a natural pace at which our ideas succeed each other. When we look at such objects, 
we still have a successive train of ideas,18 but no new, qualitatively different, ideas of 
the position of the object are produced in us as that train advances, because we do not 
notice the small differences in the position of the object between one time and 
another. Thus, again, Locke concludes that an awareness of succession requires a 
succession of ideas, and more specifically, a succession of qualitatively different 
ideas, which we become aware of through reflection. 
 How exactly are we to understand this second argument Locke gives for his 
view? On one way of understanding Locke, his argument can again be seen to involve 
an appeal to what I referred to as a mirroring theory of temporal experience. That is to 
say, Locke can be seen to suggests that, when we look at the hour hand of a clock, for 
instance, there is no change in the successive experiences we undergo, and in this 
respect what he would call our ‘train of ideas’ actually seems to mirror a situation in 
which there is no change in the position of the hand, rather than one in which there is 
a change in position. As a result, we are not aware of the movement of the hand. 
 Earlier, we saw Reid criticising the mirroring theory on the grounds of 
explanatory vacuousness – it seems to presuppose an awareness of the very type it is 
trying to explain. However, quite apart from the problem that Reid raises, it is 
arguably also the case that using such a theory in the way just sketched to account for 
                                                
18 On this, see, e.g. ibid., 2.14.13. One other strand in Locke’s argument in which this idea plays a role 
is a rejection of the traditional view of time as the measure of motion. As he puts it at one point, 
“wherever a man is, with all things at rest about him, without perceiving any motion at all; if during 
this hour of quiet he has been thinking, he will perceive the various ideas of his own thoughts in his 
own mind, appearing one after another, and thereby observe and find succession where he could 
observe no motion” (ibid., 2.14.6).   
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cases of motion too slow to be perceived simply gets it wrong about the 
phenomenology of our experiences – that’s unless we are quite radically mistaken 
about what our experiences are like.19 Note that even Locke presumably has to admit 
that, if we look at the hour hand for long enough, eventually a new, qualitatively 
different idea will be produced in us. The hour hand may not produce any new idea in 
us between some time t1 and some time t2, because it doesn’t advance enough within 
that interval. But surely at some point there must come a time t3 at which it does 
produce such a new idea, because it has moved through a sufficiently great distance. 
But then it seems that Locke would have to say that we do at least perceive the 
movement of the hand in the transition from t2 to t3. In fact, at one point Locke 
himself seems to be aware that this is an implication of his theory. He writes: 
 
[T]he constant and regular succession of ideas in a waking man, is, as it were, 
the measure and standard of all other successions. [W]here any motion or 
succession is so slow, as that it keeps not pace with the ideas in our minds, or 
the quickness in which they take their turns […] there also the sense of a 
constant continued succession is lost, and we perceive it not, but with certain 
gaps of rest between. (Locke, 1690, 2.14.12) 
 
                                                
19 There are occasional examples of philosophers who deny that there is a genuine difference between 
the case of the second hand and that of the hour hand. To Broad’s (1923, p. 351) claim that it is “clear 
that to see a second-hand moving is a quite different thing from ‘seeing’ that an hour-hand has moved” 
Plumer, for instance, responds: “[Broad] claims that he cannot see either the minute- or the hour-hand 
moving. […] I suspect he did not look at them very long (who does?)” (Plumer, 1985, p. 28). Fara 
(2001), too, questions how deep the contrast goes, though see Phillips (2011) for critical discussion. 
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Here Locke seems to be aware that, on his own theory about what happens when we 
look at slow moving objects, it is not in fact true that we do not see those objects 
move. (Or at least ‘see’ them move in the same sense in which we ‘see’ the second 
hand move, which of course we don’t strictly speaking do either on the type of 
snapshot view Locke seems to advocate in the relevant passages.) Rather, if his theory 
is right, the difference between the case of, say, the hour hand and that of the second 
hand should be that we can only intermittently see the former moving (or perhaps see 
it as though it was only intermittently moving), whereas we can constantly see the 
latter moving. Yet, that is clearly not how it appears to us. Arguably, we take it that 
we can’t see the movement of the former at all. As Locke himself says elsewhere in 
the same section: 
 
where the motion is so slow as not to supply a constant train of fresh ideas to 
the senses, as fast as the mind is capable of receiving new ones into it […] 
there the sense of motion is lost; and the body, though it really moves, yet, not 
changing perceivable distance with some other bodies as fast as the ideas of 
our own minds do naturally follow one another in train, the thing seems to 
stand still; as is evident in the hands of clocks, and shadows of sun-dials, and 
other constant but slow motions, where, though, after certain intervals, we 
perceive, by the change of distance, that it hath moved, yet the motion itself 
we perceive not. (Locke, 1690, 2.14.12) 
 
In the last sentence of this passage, Locke himself agrees that we do not see the 
motion of the hour hand. But, as we have seen, it is difficult to see how he can do so 
whilst adhering to a mirroring theory of temporal experience. Locke could, of course, 
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like Reid, adopt a memory theory of temporal experience instead, which, as I said, 
constitutes an alternative version of the snapshot view. However, as Reid recognized, 
this, too, would commit him to an error theory about our common sense view of the 
phenomenology of temporal experience. On such a view, it would of course be right 
to say that, in the case of the hour hand, all we can be aware of is that it has moved, in 
virtue of us seeing it in one position, whilst remembering it being in another. But the 
theory would have to say the same thing about the case of the second hand, which we 
ordinarily do think we can just see moving. 
 In other words, in so far as he can be interpreted as putting forward a version 
of a snapshot theory of temporal experience, Locke’s discussion of movement 
perception can also serve to illustrate that snapshot theorists seem forced to choose 
between two versions of the snapshot view, both of which ultimately deny that there 
is a phenomenological difference, of the kind envisaged by common sense, between 
the case of the hour hand and that of the second hand. Yet, what I have also tried to 
show is that this error-theoretical consequence of the snapshot view can be obscured 
if, like Locke, we do not clearly distinguish between those two different versions of 
the snapshot view, i.e. the mirroring theory and the memory theory.20 This is because 
                                                
20 Compare here also Chuard (2011, p. 9f.):  
 
At one end of the spectrum of possible atomist accounts [i.e., snapshot views of temporal 
experience], there is the more familiar suggestion that a subject’s experiential awareness of 
temporal relations involves a succession of short (or instantaneous) purely sensory 
experiences, with each sensory experience in the succession simultaneously accompanied by 
phenomenologically salient memories of previous experiences in the succession. […]  
At the other end, we find the view that all there really is, is just a succession of short-
lived or instantaneous sensory experiences: the subject has a sensory experience of an event, 
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the mirroring theory and the memory theory each involve a different way of denying 
the phenomenological contrast that common sense draws. If we try to account for 
temporal experience by appealing to the idea that the temporal structure of the “train 
of ideas” mirrors the temporal structure of what appears to be perceived, we will end 
up thinking of the phenomenology of the hour-hand case as a special case of the 
phenomenology of the second-hand case, as common sense construes it. That is, we 
will think of ourselves as perceiving the hour hand moving in much the same sense as 
we perceive the second hand moving, but doing so only intermittently, rather than 
constantly. If, by contrast, we conceive of all temporal experience as arising from a 
combination of perception and memory, like Reid does, we will end up assimilating 
the case of the second hand to the case of the hour hand, as common sense conceives 
of it. Thus, strictly speaking, we will have to say that we don’t really see the second 
hand move; rather, just like in the case of the hour hand, all we can tell is that it has 
moved.  
  
3. Conclusion 
It can sometimes feel as though the snapshot view provides a natural starting point for 
thinking about temporal aspects of perceptual awareness, even if it might perhaps turn 
out to be inadequate on further reflection. As Geoffrey Lee (2014, p. 2) writes, “many 
people do have an intuition that certain kinds of experience have a ‘series of 
                                                                                                                                      
and then another, and another. The phenomenology of temporal awareness is to be fully 
explained, on this view, as a result of the successive phenomenology of single experiences 
enjoyed in close succession.  
 
What I have been suggesting, in effect, is that there is no ‘spectrum’ here, but just two very different 
and incompatible positions.    
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snapshots’ structure: for example, it might seem as if an experience of a ball moving 
is really a series of snapshot experiences, each presenting the ball at a different 
location.” My main question in this paper has been how this can be so, given that, as 
Lee also says (ibid.), “it should be an uncontroversial starting point that we do have 
temporal experience” in the sense of simply being able to perceive certain instances of 
movement and change, which is flat-out denied by the snapshot view.   
 As I have argued, one lesson we can learn from Locke’s discussion of 
movement experience, guided by Reid’s critique of it, is that the snapshot view can 
come in two different varieties – the memory theory and the mirroring theory – each 
of which can be made to fit with some of our phenomenological intuitions.21 The 
memory theory can be made to fit with the intuition that there are some cases of 
movement or change that are too slow to be perceived, but in which we can still 
become aware of the movement or change by recalling how things used to be whilst 
perceiving them to be different now. The mirroring theory, on the other hand, can be 
made to fit the intuition that we can simply see certain cases of movement or change 
(or at least have some form of seemingly direct experiential awareness of them). It 
may therefore superficially look as though there is no deep conflict between the 
snapshot view and common sense. However, in each case, making the snapshot view 
fit one of the intuitions at issue in fact involves denying the other one. On closer 
inspection, therefore, it becomes clear that the snapshot view is deeply at odds with 
                                                
21 In Hoerl (2017) I also argue that recognising the distinction between the memory theory and the 
mirroring theory, as two different guises the snapshot view can assume, and recognising that each of 
them involves a different picture of the nature of perceptual experience in general, is also important in 
the context of explaining just how the snapshot view differs from extensionalism and retentionalism, 
respectively.  
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what we ordinarily think when we think, for instance, that there are some things that 
we can simply see moving, and others that move too slowly for us to see them move. 
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